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ABSTRACT 
The paper addresses political economy determinants of the import tariff reform in Russia 
during 2000–2001. For this purpose, Grossman–Helpman (1994) framework of endogenous 
trade policy analysis is developed to take into account government efforts to minimize losses in 
tariff revenues caused by misclassification of goods by importers. It was found that these 
revenues were in fact the leading priority in import regulation policy, followed by citizen welfare 
and contributions from business lobbies. This motivation ranking induced Russian government 
to apply lower tariff rates for goods which were likely to be misclassified more intensively, and 
higher tariff rates for goods which would have otherwise served for ‘hiding’ highly-taxed goods 
from import duties. However, there is still a substantial room for further liberalizing tariff 
unification, which can be a promising strategy to follow during the adjustment period after the 
WTO accession. 
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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY 
In 2000–2001, Russia experienced the major import tariff reform since trade liberalization 
of 1992. Its main characteristics were lowering the maximum tariff rate from 30 per cent to 20 
per cent and unification of tariff rates within broad commodity classification groups. The result 
was a limited liberalizing tariff unification (i.e., simplification of tariff structure associated with 
a general decrease in tariff rates). Results of the tariff reform were built into the new Customs 
Tariff of 2002. 
One of the key declared purposes of the reform was to generate additional budget revenues 
by limiting misclassification of higher-taxed imported goods for lower-taxed ones. In Russia, 
this problem appeared to be quite acute in the late 1990s, when both economic analysts and 
public officials complained of substantial losses in tariff revenues due to misclassification. 
International policy experience suggests three general receipts to fight import misclassification. 
These are complete tariff unification, limited tariff unification and administrative controls. 
Administrative controls, though necessary, can not solve the problem themselves, as tariff 
misclassification usually proliferates in corrupt administrative environment, and additional 
controls are likely to invite additional corruption. The most efficient policy option is complete 
tariff unification, as it eliminates any opportunity to make profits on misclassification. Such an 
option, however, is not common in the world practice (the most important exception being that 
of Chile). The reason is that complete tariff unification requires strong consensus among 
economic agents on tariff issues and/or government independence from private sector lobbying, 
which is rarely the case in the real world. 
In this sense, limited tariff unification is a much more plausible option, as it allows 
balancing interests of industrial lobbyists, general population, and the government itself. Broadly 
speaking, there are three political economy motives influencing government decisions on tariff 
reform: 
• political support and resource transfers from lobbying groups; 
• general public welfare which affects electoral chances of the incumbent government; 
• tariff revenues generated by tariff reform. 
These motives can contradict each other. In particular, government efforts to maximize 
budget revenues and lobbying for sectoral protection can be detrimental to public welfare. 
This paper assesses the impact of all three motives listed above on Russian import tariff 
structure established by Customs Tariff of 2002. Empirical study is based on Grossman–
Helpman (1994) framework of endogenous trade policy analysis, which is further developed to 
take into account government efforts to minimize losses in tariff revenues caused by 
misclassification of goods by importers. It was found that these revenues were in fact the leading 
priority in import regulation policy, followed by citizen welfare and contributions from business 
lobbies. Concern about tariff revenues appears to be a rather important feature of Russian trade 
policy reform, in sharp contrast with the experience of transition countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe. 
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This motivation ranking induced Russian government to apply lower tariff rates to goods 
which were likely to be misclassified more intensively, and higher tariff rates for goods which 
would have otherwise served for ‘hiding’ highly-taxed goods from import duties. There are, 
however, important cases where government still applies too high tariff rates to intensively 
misclassified goods, especially in specific subsectors of chemical industry, machine-building, 
and food industry. This finding points to the significant room for further liberalizing tariff 
unification. 
Good news for the consequences of this potential unification is that citizen welfare is 
ranked in government preference schedule higher than lobbying resources. This means that 
lobbying activities are not likely to dominate tariff policy, and thus it is likely to be welfare-
improving. One can thus recommend further liberalizing tariff unification as a promising 
strategy to follow during the adjustment period after the WTO accession. 
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POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TARIFF UNIFICATION: 
THE CASE OF RUSSIA 
 
1. THE PROBLEM 
Trade policy plays two major roles in economic system. First, it protects national 
producers facing intensive foreign competition, and second, it provides government with 
financial resources to supplement ordinary fiscal revenues. Thus, when formulating strategy of 
trade policy reform, government of a transition country faces the problem of finding balance 
between two priorities, i.e., minimizing distortions induced by trade taxes, on the one hand, and 
minimizing losses in trade tax revenues, on the other. In particular, an important aspect of 
efficient trade policy reform has to do with creating incentives for importers to abandon different 
methods of trade tax evasion, including those of misclassifying trade articles subjected to higher 
tariffs for low–tariff ones. 
In Russia, misclassification problem appeared to be quite acute in the late 1990s, when 
both economic analysts and officials of the State Customs Committee complained of substantial 
losses in tariff revenues due to misclassification. Among the most commonly cited examples 
were, e.g., misclassifying chicken (25 per cent ad valorem tariff rate) for turkey (15 per cent 
rate), TV-sets (compound tariff rate with 30 per cent ad valorem component) for consumer 
electrical machines (20 per cent ad valorem tariff rate), flowers (25 per cent rate) for greenery (5 
per cent rate). Given the fact that import tariff revenues constituted 9 to 11 per cent of total 
federal tax revenues in 1998–1999, widespread misclassification was generally considered to 
become rather dangerous for revenue-constrained government.1 To cope with this problem, it 
undertook a profound import policy reform in 2000–2001. 
In September, 2000 Russian government approved the new Concept of customs and tariff 
policy. This Concept suggested (1) lowering the maximum tariff rate from 30 per cent to 20 per 
cent, (2) unification of tariff rates within broad classification groups, and (3) a set of 
administrative measures intended to fight illegal importation schemes. In November, 2000 the 
government revised the Customs Tariff in lines with this concept.2 The principal innovations in 
the tariff structure were as follows: 
• abolition of the seven-grade system of ad valorem import duties (0, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30 
per cent) in favor of four-grade one (5, 10, 15, 20); other ad valorem rates and ad valorem 
components of compound tariff rates can be applied only in exceptional cases3; 
• large-scale unification of tariff rates within commodity groups with close consumer 
characteristics. 
                                                 
1 In fact, misclassification affects not only tariff revenues but also revenues from the VAT and 
excises on imported goods. Total revenues from these three import taxes equaled 24–25 per cent of 
federal tax revenues in 1998–1999 (External Sector of the Russian Economy..., 2000, p.91). 
2 Government resolution no.886 approved on November 27, 2000. 
3 Exceptions were still quite numerous. These were, e.g., some medications and special types of 
capital equipment (zero tariffs), chicken and cars (25 per cent rate), tobacco products (30 per cent rate), 
white sugar (40 per cent rate), etc. 
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The reform of 2000 profoundly affected ad valorem tariff rates for goods belonging to 
practically all two-digit commodity groups. In 2001, further steps in this direction followed. 
Import duties on 610 commodity groups were changed from October 1, 2001 and on 140 more 
commodity groups from January 1, 2002, with some 80 and 90 per cent of changes, respectively, 
being of liberalizing nature. The results of the tariff reform were built into the new Customs 
Tariff of 2002.4 
The declared purpose of tariff reform was ‘to generate additional budget revenues without 
causing harm to domestic producers’.5 The consequence was a limited liberalizing tariff 
unification (i.e., simplification of tariff structure associated with a unification of tariff rates 
within broad commodity classification groups as well as a general decrease in tariff rates). Three 
motives for import tariff unification are suggested in literature: 
(1) reduction of economic distortions resulting from high and differentiated tariff rates; 
(2) prevention of tariff revenue losses due to misclassification of goods by importers; 
(3) elimination of incentives for interest groups to lobby for protection. 
The most remarkable tariff unification exercise of the last decades, that of Chile, is usually 
assumed to address motives (1) and (3).6 Official motivation for tariff reform in Russia seems to 
suggest motives (1) and (2). But can we rely on this statement in understanding the actual logic 
of tariff formation mechanisms in Russia? This question is rather important, as these 
mechanisms are likely to shape the structure of import tariff regulation during and after the WTO 
accession period. 
To answer this question, we need a unified theoretical framework, which takes into 
account welfare consequences of trade policy, lobbying activities, and incentives to misclassify 
imports. Such a framework is put forward in section 2. It is based on Grossman–Helpman (1994) 
model of trade policy formation (henceforth G–H model), which is known to be the principal 
analytically rigorous framework for explaining political economy determinants of trade 
regulation structure. Earlier political economy models provided only a sort of a guide to political 
economy variables to be used for testing alternative hypotheses.7 By contrast, G–H model 
provides unambiguous predictions concerning the impact of particular variables on trade policy 
decisions. 
The original G–H model, however, takes into account only the behavior of (1) lobbies 
interested in maximizing their welfare and (2) government interested in maximizing a weighted 
function of political contributions from lobbies and aggregate welfare of citizens. In this model, 
                                                 
4 Newly established tariff structure contains 10666 10-digit tariff lines, with different goods being 
levied with ad valorem (in per cent of declared value), specific (in euros per physical unit) and compound 
(with both ad valorem and specific components) tariffs. 
5 External Sector of the Russian Economy..., 2000, p.75–76. 
6 See, e.g., Corbo, 1997; Edwards and Lederman, 1998. For general discussion of tariff uniformity 
question, see Tarr, 2002. 
7 In our previous works we relied on this less formalized framework of empirical analysis; see 
Afontsev, 2000; Afontsev, 2002. For an overview of ‘pre-Grossman–Helpman’ works on political 
economy of tariff protection, see Magee et al., 1989; Rodrik, 1995; on socioeconomic determinants of 
protectionism, see Mayda and Rodrik, 2001. 
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the government is able to get perfect information on import volumes and extracts tariff revenues 
equal to the actual value of imports multiplied by respective tariff rates. To address the 
phenomenon of misclassification, we need to introduce an additional group of agents, i.e., 
importers who can cheat the government by misclassifying goods they are trading in. This can 
result in actual tariff revenues falling short of tariff revenues due for a given tariff structure and 
actual import volumes. Incorporation of the tariff evasion argument into G–H model allows us to 
address all three motives for liberalizing tariff unification and develop an empirical model to 
analyze determinants of Russian tariff structure established by the reform of 2000–2001. 
 
 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
All individuals in an economy have identical preferences, identical labor endowments but 
different specific factor endowments. Individuals maximize utility function 
 
U = c0 + Σui(ci),         (1) 
 
where c0 denotes consumption of exportable numeraire good, ci denotes consumption of 
importable differentiated good i, with ui being differentiable, increasing, strictly concave 
function. The price of the numeraire good equals 1, and domestic price of differentiated good 
equals pi. Demand for each differentiated good di(pi) implied by (1) is given by the inverse of 
ui′(ci). An individual with income yk consumes cki=di(pi) of good i, and the consumption of the 
numeraire good is given by ck0=yk–Σpidi(pi). Indirect utility function of an individual is thus 
 
Vk = yk + Σski(pi),        (2) 
 
where ski(pi) is the individual consumer surplus derived from differentiated goods, 
ski(pi)=ui(di(pi))–pidi(pi). 
Economy is populated with two types of agents, producers and importers. In a small open 
economy domestic price of differentiated good equals pi=p*i+tsi, where p*i is an exogenous 
world price of good i, and tsi is a specific import tariff (tsi>0) or subsidy (tsi<0). 
 
Production side. The numeraire good is produced using labor only with constant returns to 
scale and with input-output coefficient equal to one; thus, wages also equal one. Differentiated 
good is produced with labor and one sector-specific input, also with constant returns to scale. As 
wages equal one, returns on sector-specific factor used in production of good i depend on price 
of this good only: πi=πi(pi). Domestic output of differentiated good is thus Xi=πi′(pi). Producers 
of each differentiated good and producers of the numeraire good represent fractions ai and an of 
the total population, respectively. Their gross welfare is given by 
 
Wi = πi + ai[L + Σsi(pi)],       (3) 
Wn = an[L + Σsi(pi)],        (4) 
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where L is total labor income (given that the total labor supply in the economy equals L and 
wage rate equals 1), and Σsi(pi) is the aggregate consumer surplus. 
If producers in a subset of differentiated good industries are politically organized, they can 
influence tsi by providing the government with political support measured by financial 
contributions Ci.8 Their behavioral strategy is thus to maximize net welfare Wi–Ci. 
 
Importers’ side. Import operations are conducted using labor only, with wages being 
determined in the numeraire sector. Thus, legal income of importers equals 
 
Wmlegal = am[L + Σsi(pi)],        (5) 
 
where am is a share of importers in the total population. 
Importers can also make illegal profits on misclassifying higher-taxed (lower-subsidized) 
articles for lower-taxed (higher-subsidized) ones9. We assume that importers misreport only type 
of goods traded, not their value. Actual imports Mi of each differentiated good equal difference 
between domestic consumption di(pi) and domestic production Xi: 
 
Mi = di(pi) – Xi.         (6) 
 
Denote the probability of audit over import operations in good i by ρi and the probability 
of revealing misclassification with audit by λi. When misclassification is revealed, importers are 
demanded to pay tariffs on actual imports and compensate audit costs Θi; if audit reveals no 
misclassification, audit costs are born by the government. For a given specific tariff rate tsi 
importers choose the proportion ξij of each good i misclassified for good j, so as the declared 
volume of imports Mmi is 
 
Mmi = Mi – ΣjξijMi + ΣjξjiMj       (7) 
 
and the taxed volume of imports is 
 
Mi = Mi – Σjξij(1-ρiλi)Mi + Σjξji(1-ρjλj)Mj.     (8) 
 
                                                 
8 In a more sophisticated framework, this subset of industries can be modeled as a result of an 
endogenous selection process among lobbies willing to participate in bargaining over policy issues (on 
endogenous lobby formation, see Mitra, 1999; Felli and Merlo, 2002). In this paper we assume that such a 
subset had been already in place at the time of the tariff reform. 
9 This is the major novelty of our approach. As far as we know, no attempt was made before to 
study the impact of importers’ opportunistic behavior on predictions of G–H model (though there are 
works taking into account importers’ lobbying behavior; see, e.g., Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare, 2002). To 
model tariff evasion, we relied on basic approaches of the tax compliance literature; for an overview, see 
Andreoni at al., 1998. 
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With imperfect monitoring over import operations (ρi<1, λi<1), importers maximize their 
illegal income 
 
Wmillegal = Σtsi(Mi – Mi) – ΣρiλiΘi,      (9) 
 
the FOC’s with respect to tsi being 
 
tsiMi′ + Mi = tsiMi′ + Mi,       (10) 
 
where Mi′=dMi/dtsi=dMi/dpi, Mi′=dMi/dtsi=dMi/dpi. Given that changes in Mi are in fact induced 
by changes in the appropriate ξij’s, expression (10) is an aggregated presentation of conditions 
for individual welfare maximization. 
Total welfare of importers Wm is the sum of its legal and illegal components. If importers 
are politically organized, they can attempt to influence tariffs by financial contributions Cm1 and 
probability of audit by Cm2 to maximize their net welfare Wm–Cm1–Cm2.10 
 
Government policy. The government cares about welfare of citizens (W), budget revenues 
(R), and lobbying contributions: 
 
G = αW + βΣR + ΣCi + Cm1 + Cm2,      (11) 
 
where α and β are relative weights attached by the government to citizen welfare and budget 
revenues (the respective weight of lobbying contributions equals one). Given (3)–(5) and (9), 
 
W = Σπi + L + Σsi(pi) + Σtsi(Mi – Mi) – ΣρiλiΘi.     (12) 
 
In turn, budget revenues equal tariff receipts minus net audit costs (i.e., total audit costs net 
of compensation paid by importers ‘caught in action’): 
 
R = ΣtsiMi + ΣρiΘi(λi–1).       (13) 
 
We prefer to use not the menu auction political interaction model presented in the original 
Grossman–Helpman paper but the simplified Nash bargaining model proposed by Goldberg and 
Maggi, 1999, which generates just the same trade policy results. In this model, a Nash 
bargaining solution guarantees that equilibrium import policies maximize the joint surplus all 
parties involved. This means maximizing  
 
J = αW + (1–α)Σ(Wi,i∈O) + (1–α)Wm + βΣR,     (14) 
 
                                                 
10 Note that in our model the only loser from misclassification is the government. Thus, producers 
have no incentive to influence probability of audit by lobbying. 
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where O is a subset of organized industries. This gives us 
 
J = (α + (1–α)(aO+am))L + [α + (1–α)Ii]Σπi + (α+(1–α)(aO+am))Σsi(pi) +  
   + ΣtsiMi + (β–1)ΣtsiMi + ΣΘiρi(β(λi–1)–λi),   (15) 
 
where aO is the share of population endowed with sector-specific factors represented by 
organized industrial lobbies and Ii is a dummy variable which equals 1 if producers in the 
respective sector are organized and 0 otherwise. 
The FOCs for maximizing (15) with respect to tsi (or, which is the same, with respect to pi) 
and ρi are given by 
 
∂J/∂tsi = [α + (1–α)Ii]Xi + [α+(1–α)(aO+am)](–di(pi)) +  
  + Mi + tsiMi′ + (β-1)Mi + (β–1)tsiMi′ = 0.   (16) 
 
∂J/∂ρi = β(λi–1)–λi.        (17) 
 
As can be seen, both tsi and ρi are endogenous, i.e., they are determined by the interaction 
among government, producer lobbies, and importers maximizing their own objective functions. 
Expression (17) gives us the simple audit rule: ρi=0 for all λi≤β/(β-1) and ρi=1 for all λi>β/(β-1). 
In its turn, (16) can be rewritten using (6) and (10) as 
 
(1–α)(Ii–aO–am)Xi + [α+(1–α)(aO+am)]Mi + βtsiMi′ + βMi = 0.   (18) 
 
Let 
 
mi=Mi – Mi         (19) 
 
measure deviation of taxed from actual imports (quite naturally, mi is expected to be negative for 
higher-taxed goods, as importers are prone to underreport their imports, and positive for lower-
taxed ones). Then 
 
–βtsiMi = (1–α)(Ii–aO–am)Xi + [β–α–(1–α)(aO+am)]Mi +  
+ [α+(1–α)(aO+am)]mi. (20) 
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This yields 
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Divide both sides of (21) by pi. Using expressions for price elasticity of observed imports  
ei ≡ –Mi′ pM
i
i
, inverse observed import penetration zi ≡ XM
i
i
, and the ratio of misclassified to 
actual imports µ ≡ mi
iM
11, and noting that tsi/pi=ti/(1+ti) (where ti is ad valorem equivalent of 
specific tariff rate tsi), we have 
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Expression (22) can be compared with the standard G–H formula: 
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where Zi ≡ 
i
iX
M
 is actual (rather than observed) inverse import penetration ratio, and Ei is price 
elasticity of actual imports: Ei ≡ –Mi′ pi
iM
. 
 
The original G–H formulation (22′) has the following implications for trade policy, given 
that α<1: 
(1) as the first term in the right-hand side expression in (22′) is positive for Ii=1, tariff rates 
in organized sectors increase with inverse import penetration Xi/Mi; that is, the larger the volume 
of domestic production, the more specific-factor owners have to gain from a given increase in 
prices, whereas the lower the volume of imports, the less the economy has to lose from 
protection; 
(2) on the contrary, in unorganized industries protection rises with the level of import 
penetration, as the first term in the right-hand side expression is negative for Ii=0; 
(3) higher protection level corresponds to lower import elasticity in a sector, as the latter 
means lower deadweight losses, and thus the government is more willing to grant protection to 
this sector. 
                                                 
11 Note that µ≥–1, as importers can not hide more goods than they actually import. 
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In (22), we shift from actual to observed measures of inverse import penetration and price 
elasticities of imports, as well as introduce the additional variable capturing the effect of 
misclassification. If we are to produce predictions in lines with those of G–H model with α<1, 
they are as follows: 
 
(1*) tariff rates in organized sectors increase with observed inverse import penetration 
Xi/Mi; 
(2*) in unorganized industries, protection decreases with the level of observed inverse 
import penetration; 
(3*) higher protection level corresponds to lower observed import elasticity; 
(4*) if deviation of observed imports from their actual level (mi) is positive (i.e., other 
goods are misclassified for good i), higher absolute value of 
mi
iM
 invites government to apply 
higher tariffs, while if mi is negative (i.e., imports of good i are misclassified for imports of other 
goods), higher absolute value of 
mi
iM
 corresponds to lower tariffs. 
In fact, (4*) provides the political economy explanation of the endogenous tariff 
unification: 
Given imperfect monitoring over import operations and government 
concern over budget revenues, equilibrium import tariff structure will 
be more uniform to limit tariff evasion. 
In the next section we test propositions (1*)–(4*) using Russian tariff structure established 
by the reform of 2000–2001 as a touchstone. 
 
 
 
2. EMPIRICAL EXERCISE 
2.1. Model and Data 
To test formulation (22) and its implications, we estimated the following econometric 
model: 
 
i
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ε ,   (23) 
 
where A1=(1–α)/β, A2=(1–α)(–aO–am)/β, A3=(β–α–(1–α)(aO+am))/β, and A4=(α+(1–
α)(aO+am))/β (note that A4=1–A3). 
 
The focus of our study is on industries, not on commodity groups of the customs statistics, 
as only for industries we can find data on domestic output to calculate observed inverse import 
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penetration zi. To obtain taxed import volumes for particular industries, we aggregated data on 
Russian imports (taken from the State Customs Committee database) for particular OKONKh 
industries12. 
The dependent variables used in (23) are ad valorem tariff rates and ad valorem 
equivalents of specific tariff rates in 2002, aggregated by industries using weights equal to shares 
of the respective commodity groups in industry imports.13 
Calculation of observed import demand elasticities presents a very complicated problem. 
The usual approach to get their values is based on the simultaneous dynamic estimation of 
supply and demand functions for imported and home-produced good varieties (see, e.g., 
Senhadji, 1998). This procedure can not be used in the Russian case due to the very short time 
period for which trade data are available (starting from 1994) as well as the lack of data needed 
for such an estimation at the level of disaggregated commodity groups. We can, however, 
estimate short-run elasticities using data on relative drop in imports, which resulted from the 
devaluation of 1998. As the scale of devaluation by far exceeded variation in other variables 
influencing import volumes, we can consider deviation of imports in Q2–Q4 1998 from the trend 
observed in Q2–Q4 1997 as induced mainly by exchange rate dynamics.14 These deviations can 
be calculated as 
 
∆Mi98Q4 = Mi98Q4 – Mi98Q2× i Q
i Q
M
M
97 4
97 2
.      (24) 
 
Then, using 
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we obtain an estimate of short-term import elasticities in respect of exchange rate, which can be 
interpreted as an approximation of short-term price elasticities of imports15 (MiyQq stands for the 
                                                 
12 OKONKh (the Unified Classificatory of Industries) was used to report production statistics up to 
2002. The major data limitations we faced were as follows. First, Russian production statistics provide no 
information for some industries (the most important of them are industries producing electronic 
equipment and particular branches of non-ferrous metallurgy). Second, Russian trade statistics often 
combine items produced by different industries under the same commodity code, and sometimes we were 
unable to decompose them properly. To cope with the last problem, we aggregated some industries into 
groups for which total import flows can be calculated more accurately (there are 8 such groups in our 
database). 
13 In case of compound tariff rates we used the maximum of ad valorem component and ad valorem 
equivalent of specific component. 
14 Of course, this is a rather strong assumption, but, if we take into account the degree of exchange 
rate variation, it seems to be quite reasonable for analyzing relative impact of price changes on import 
flows in the short run. We should note that the traditional method of estimating import elasticities also 
provides very rough results, with many elasticity coefficients turning out to be statistically insignificant or 
even having the wrong sign (Shiels, Stern and Deadorff, 1986). Despite this fact, they are widely used in 
research practice due to the lack of more reliable alternatives (see, e.g., Goldberg and Maggi, 1999). 
15 In fact, import elasticities in respect of exchange rate take into account both price and income 
effects of devaluation. To estimate (23) we need, however, only ordinal, not cardinal information on 
  15. 
volume of imports of good i in quarter q of year y, r98Q2 is the ruble-dollar exchange rate in Q2 
1998 and ∆r98Q2-Q4 is the exchange rate change in Q2–Q4 1998). This procedure worked quite 
satisfactorily. Only eight elasticity estimates appeared to have the wrong sign, those being 
characteristic of either raw material or machine building industries (for the latter, the bulk of 
imported goods is known to be reported in Q4 of each year, irrespective of the time of signing 
contracts, and thus exchange rate fluctuations affect trade statistics only with a significant time 
lag). We dropped these industries from our sample, which finally included 150 non-agricultural 
industries (73.15 per cent of total imports in 199916). 
To identify ‘organized’ industries, we used the standard assumption that the number of 
firms in an industry is positively correlated with the degree of free rider problem undermining 
cooperative outcomes,17 and experimented with different «threshold hypotheses» stating that 
industries are organized if the number of firms does not exceed certain level (for details, see 
Appendix 1). 
The most important question is related to the estimation of our measure of import 
misclassification variable µ. In a two-country case, the most appropriate starting point would be 
to compare national import statistics with export statistics of a partner country (as was done, e.g., 
in Fishman and Wei, 2001, for trade between China and Hong Kong). As for trade between 
Russia and the ‘other world’, this option is clearly unavailable due to impossibility to get access 
to disaggregated trade statistics of all countries trading with Russia. Instead, we thus attempted 
to instrument inverse import penetration variable zi with the set of variables considered as major 
determinants of trade structure. Then, taking instrumented values for actual imports volumes, we 
used the appropriate formula for the misclassification variable µ (Appendix 2). 
Such a procedure invites criticism for the following reasons. On the one hand, ‘missing 
trade’ (i.e., deviation of observed trade flows from predicted ones) can result not from 
misclassification of goods but from deficiencies of model used to predict trade (Trefler, 1995). 
On the other hand, our theoretical model presented in Section 2 rests on a rather strict 
assumption that importers misreport only type of goods, not their value, which is in fact 
equivalent to assuming that there is no smuggling. In the real world, however, significant part of 
Russian imports evades customs control at all, being either smuggled or transported by private 
individuals (so called ‘shuttle trade’ not registered by customs). 
To cope with the first problem, we experimented with a number of model specifications, 
including those with variables of factor cost shares, factor productivity, import elasticities, and 
scale of production in various industries. Table A1 in Appendix 2 reports the best fit 
                                                                                                                                                             
import elasticities, and the assumption that ordinal rankings of import elasticities in respect of exchange 
rate and prices are quite close in the short run seems to be realistic. 
16 The choice of 1999 as a base year for calculating independent variables is quite natural given that 
it exactly preceded the tariff reform. Additional advantage of such a choice is that it precludes 
endogenous effects of tariff rates (taken from the Customs Tariff of 2002) on independent variables. 
Disaggregated data on production and production costs were taken from the following publications: Main 
Results of Industrial Production by Industries and Property Types. M.: Goskomstat, 2000; Costs of 
Production and Selling of Industrial Output in Q4 1999. M.: Goskomstat, 2000 (both are in Russian). 
17 The classical formulation is of course Olson, 1965. Tough some recent developments raise 
doubts on this assumption (e.g., Pecorino, 1998), it is nevertheless widely used. 
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specification, which includes only factor cost shares and the scale of production. Two comments 
are necessary on this specification. First, statistical fit (R2=0.32) seems to be rather good for this 
class of dependent variables, which is known to be extremely ‘resistant’ to explanations and 
even approximations. Second, the fact that many coefficients are not statistically significant does 
not undermine the value of the model. As we are interested not in revealing particular 
determinants of trade structure, we did not approach an in-depth analysis of standard errors; for 
the purposes of our paper, approximation of trade flows is enough.18 
Even if we accept predicted values from the model presented in Appendix 2 as correct 
estimates of inverse import penetration, calculation of the import misclassification variable still 
suffers from the presence of smuggling and shuttle imports. As distinct from misclassification, 
these trade practices cause observed imports of higher-taxed goods to be lower than their actual 
imports without the corresponding increase in observed imports of lower-taxed goods over their 
actual volumes. In other words, almost all the difference between actual and observed imports 
for zero-taxed articles is due to misclassification, while the higher tariff rates, the higher share of 
this deviation is due to smuggling and shuttle imports. As in any case we are not able to 
differentiate statistically between misclassification of imports, on the one hand, and smuggling 
and shuttle imports, on the other, our procedure overestimates the misclassification variable µ for 
higher-taxed goods. This is not to change our predictions concerning the impact of µ, however, 
as the government can be as much prone to reduce smuggling as it is to reduce misclassification. 
Having all this in mind, we can proceed with our econometric exercise. 
 
 
2.2. Empirical Results 
Table 1 presents comparative estimation results of our extended G–H model (23), 
standard-form G–H model with observed inverse import penetration, and no-threshold model 
denying the entire logic of G–H model. As can be seen, all variables of the extended G–H model 
have statistically significant signs. The striking finding is, however, that the only variable with 
the sign predicted by (1*)–(4*) is the inverse import elasticity.19 
For variables i
i
i
I ze  and 
i
i
z
e  to have ‘incorrect’ signs, the weight attached by the 
government to citizen welfare should exceed unity, i.e., it should be higher than the weight 
attached to lobbying contributions.20 On the contrary, the case of the variable 
1
1
1µ +



 ie
 is 
completely counterintuitive, as its coefficient not only has the wrong sign but also contradicts the 
                                                 
18 Cf., e.g., Goldberg and Maggi, p.1152, Table A1 and especially Table A2, and comments on 
p.1145 concerning interpretation of coefficient signs. 
19 The entire pattern breaks down for N=164. This can suggest that the ‘organizational threshold’ is 
likely to be somewhere between 129 and 164 firms per industry. 
20 This result closely corresponds to conclusions of previous studies. E.g., Goldberg and Maggi, 
1999, and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay, 2000 report that the weight attached to welfare of citizens is 
close to the weight of resource transfers from pressure groups (or even exceeds it). 
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logic of the model (this coefficient, denoted as A4 in (23), had to equal unity minus coefficient on 
1
ie
, which is not the case). 
 
Table 1. Testing G–H Models of Tariff Formation 
 Threshold 1 (N=70) Threshold 2 (N=129) No-threshold 
 Extended G–H Standard G–H Extended G–H Standard G–H model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
i
i
i
I ze
 -0.000089 
-5.666*** 
-0.000052 
-4.666*** 
-0.000086 
-5.789*** 
-0.00005 
-5.024*** 
 
i
i
z
e
 0.000047 
4.639*** 
0.000054 
4.800*** 
0.000045 
4.820*** 
0.00005 
5.177*** 
-0.000013 
-0.732 
1
ie
 0.00056 
3.038*** 
 0.00055 
2.994*** 
 0.00039 
1.770* 
1
1
1µ+



 ie
 -0.00051 
-3.508*** 
 -0.00049 
-3.636*** 
 -0.00017 
-0.814 
χ2 77.44*** 26.55*** 101.69*** 30.29*** 9.51** 
Log L 120.32 117.36 120.02 117.21 117.07 
Notes. Maximum likelihood estimation with robust standard errors and suppressed constant term. Dependent 
variable: ti/(ti+1), where ti is ad valorem tariff rate. z-statistics in parentheses. *** – 1 per cent confidence level, ** 
– 5 per cent confidence level, * – 10 per cent confidence level. 
 
Given formulae for coefficient values presented in (23), and interpreting the 
misclassification term as a ‘violator’ of the model, we can solve for α, β, and (aO+am). Using the 
best fit specification presented in column (3) of Table 1, we obtain 
 
α Relative weight attached to citizen welfare 1.000086 
β Relative weight attached to budget revenues 1.000594 
aO+am Share of population represented by organized groups 52.2 per cent 
 
Both α and β are quite close to unity, suggesting that weights attached by the government 
to its political economy priorities are ‘almost’ the same. The leader is, however, budget revenues 
followed by citizen welfare, with lobbying contributions having the lowest rank in government 
preference schedule. Given the emphasis on budget revenues, counterintuitive sign on the 
misclassification term seems even more puzzling and invites further exploration. First of all, we 
can suspect that our empirical model (23) suffers from specification problems. As for only two 
observations in our industry database tariff rate was below 5 per cent, we used censored 
estimation technique to take into account (potentially) exogenous nature of this constraint (Table 
2). Inverse import penetration variable for unorganized industries is no more statistically 
significant, but other effects are still present, including that of the misclassification variable. 
 
Table 2. Results of Censored Model Tests 
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 Threshold 1 (N=70) Threshold 2 (N=129) No threshold 
i
i
i
I ze
 -0.000072 
-2.339** 
-0.000079 
-2.234** 
 
i
i
z
e
 0.000023 
1.058 
0.000027 
1.299 
-0.000022 
-0.959 
1
ie
 0.00052 
3.253*** 
0.00054 
2.872*** 
0.00037 
1.927* 
1
1
1µ+



 ie
 -0.00052 
-2.752*** 
-0.00055 
-2.245** 
-0.00024 
-0.924 
χ2 75.11*** 148.44*** 4.62 
Log L 53.38 53.60 52.01 
Notes. Maximum likelihood estimation with robust standard errors and suppressed constant term. Dependent 
variable: ti/(ti+1), where ti is ad valorem tariff rate. 109 uncensored observations, 41 left-censored observations 
(censoring level corresponds to 5 per cent tariff rate). z-statistics in parentheses. *** – 1 per cent confidence level, 
** – 5 per cent confidence level, * – 10 per cent confidence level. 
 
Literature suggests also that problems can be caused by the endogeneity of the elasticity 
variable and errors in its measurement, the proposed remedy being a ‘transfer’ of the elasticity 
term to the left-hand side of the equation (Goldberg and Maggi, 1999, p.1140). We followed this 
recommendation and tested models with rearranged elasticity term. The results are striking 
(Table 3). Our models almost boil down to the constant-only ones (log likelihood in constant-
only models always exceeds 254), the threshold term as well as the misclassification term appear 
to be statistically insignificant, and the sign of the inverse import penetration turns to be negative 
and statistically significant, just as supposed by the ‘pre-Grossman–Helpman’ generation of ad 
hoc endogenous protection model. This invites us to experiment with these ad hoc specifications 
to compare their predictive value with that of our extended G–H model. 
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Table 3. Models with Rearranged Elasticity Term 
 Threshold 1 (N=70) Threshold 2 (N=129) No threshold 
Iizi 0.000016 
0.385 
7.21e-06 
0.178 
 
zi -0.000067 
-2.780*** 
-0.00006 
-2.452** 
-0.000054 
-1.392 



 +11
1
µ
 -0.00054 
-1.067 
-0.00056 
-1.093 
-0.00057 
-1.258 
Y-intercept 0.047 
12.669*** 
0.047 
12.694*** 
0.047 
12.873*** 
χ2 29.18*** 26.78*** 23.42*** 
Log L 256.03 256.01 256.00 
Notes. Maximum likelihood estimation with robust standard errors. Dependent variable: eiti/(ti+1), where ei is 
import elasticity and ti is ad valorem tariff rate. z-statistics in parentheses. *** – 1 per cent confidence level, ** – 5 
per cent confidence level, * – 10 per cent confidence level. 
 
For such an experiment, we used the following variables.21 First, we considered impacts of 
the inverse import penetration zi and the organizational variable Ii (with threshold levels N=70 
and N=129) taken apart rather that together. According to the ‘pre-Grossman–Helpman’ logic, 
the impact of the former should be negative (industries with higher inverse import penetration 
need protection less and thus enjoy lower tariffs), while that of the latter should be positive 
(organized industries get higher tariffs). Second, we introduced our misclassification measure µ 
directly rather than indirectly, as in (23), to test whether the government is in fact sensitive to the 
misclassification problem. Third, our ad hoc model includes several variables in lines with 
findings of the previous studies on endogenous tariff formation in Russia. Value of industry 
imports Mi controls for incentives to maximize tariff revenues by levying high tariffs on those 
items that account for the highest share of imports (in this case the government can receive the 
highest revenues from a given percentage increase in tariff rates, while at the same time abstain 
from increasing tariffs on other import articles and thus from inducing additional distortions in 
the economy). Number of companies (Ni) characterizes size and geographical dispersion of the 
industrial electorate, and at the same time provides an additional test for the traditional 
assumption that industries with more firms are less efficient in organizing pressure for higher 
tariffs. Finally, average output per firm (Avout) stands for average stakes of firms belonging to 
particular industries and their resources available for lobbying. 
Table 4 presents results of estimating three variants of this ad hoc model. Only the 
misclassification variable µ is statistically significant in all specifications; positive impact of the 
variable Ni corresponds to our previous findings (larger industrial electorate attracts higher 
protection), but it is not statistically significant in specifications with organizational variable Ii. 
Coefficient on the inverse imports penetration variable is intuitive but not statistically 
                                                 
21 For a survey of general results of testing ad hoc political economy models, see Rodrik, 1995. For 
application of these models to trade policy in Russia, see Afontsev, 2000; Afontsev, 2002. 
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significant, while coefficient on the organizational variable is counterintuitive. Together with 
poor results of testing no-threshold specifications presented in the last columns of Tables 1–3, 
these findings strongly favor the G–H logic as compared with that of ad hoc model.22 
 
Table 4. Ad Hoc Protection Model 
 Variant 1 Variant 2 Variant 3 
zi -3.22e-06 
-1.626 
-1.57e-06 
-0.744 
-2.33e-06 
-1.169 
µ 1.271e-03 
2.569*** 
1.588e-03 
3.297*** 
1.474e-03 
3.360*** 
Mi 1.25e-08 
0.357 
8.43e-10 
0.024 
5.72e-09 
0.148 
Ni 6.27e-06 
1.950* 
4.62e-06 
1.387 
4.40e-06 
1.378 
Ii (N=70)   -0.023 
-2.461** 
 
Ii (N=129)   -0.017 
-1.560 
Avout -3.48e-07 
-1.425 
-1.74e-07 
-0.842 
-2.36e-07 
-1.107 
Y-intercept 0.092 
16.591*** 
0.100 
15.209*** 
0.100 
11.416*** 
χ2 21.97*** 32.23*** 32.29*** 
Log L 235.00 237.54 236.45 
Notes. Maximum likelihood estimation with robust standard errors. Dependent variable: ti/(ti+1), where ti is ad 
valorem tariff rate. z-statistics in parentheses. *** – 1 per cent confidence level, ** – 5 per cent confidence level, * 
– 10 per cent confidence level. 
 
The major novelty of the ad hoc model is that import misclassification variable µ is 
statistically significant with a correct sign, testifying that the government does in fact pay 
attention to import misclassification and tries to limit it with more unified tariffs. With this result 
at hand, we can attempt to construct the ad hoc reformulation of the extended G–H model. As 
Table 5 shows, ad hoc introduction of the variable µ into the model supports the hypothesis that 
the government pays attention to the misclassification phenomenon in a more direct way than the 
extended G–H model predicts. The impact of this variable on tariff rates corresponds to our 
political economy argument for tariff unification and further stresses the fact that revenue 
considerations play the principal role in Russian import policy. 
 
Table 5. Ad Hoc Reformulations of the Extended G–H Model 
                                                 
22 We also tested linear specifications of our ad hoc model using both OLS technique and two-stage 
SLS with inverse import penetration being instrumented with independent variables described in 
Appendix 2. The respective findings concerning the impact of individual variables on tariff rates 
correspond to those presented in Table 4. 
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 Threshold 1 (N=70) Threshold 2 (N=129) 
i
i
i
I ze
 -0.000050 
-4.346*** 
-0.000048 
-4.646 
i
i
z
e
 0.000051 
4.476*** 
0.000049 
4.795*** 
1
ie
 0.00025 
1.664* 
0.00025 
1.657* 
µ 0.0040 
3.079*** 
0.0040 
3.078*** 
χ2 38.49*** 41.76*** 
Log L 124.93 124.77 
Notes. Maximum likelihood estimation with robust standard errors and suppressed constant term. Dependent 
variable: ti/(ti+1), where ti is ad valorem tariff rate. z-statistics in parentheses. *** – 1 per cent confidence level, ** 
– 5 per cent confidence level, * – 10 per cent confidence level. 
 
 
3. CONCLUSIONS 
Empirical study of import tariff structure established by Customs Tariff of 2002 showed 
that the leading priority in government tariff policy was budget revenues; they were followed by 
citizen welfare, with lobbying resources having the lowest rank in the government preference 
schedule. Concern about tariff revenues appears to be a rather important feature of Russian trade 
policy reform, in sharp contrast with the experience of transition countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe. 
On the average, Russian government applies lower tariff rates for goods which are likely to 
be misclassified more intensively, and higher tariff rates for goods which would otherwise serve 
as ‘safe havens’ for hiding highly-taxed goods from import duties. There are, however, important 
cases where the government still applies too high tariff rates to intensively misclassified goods, 
especially in specific subsectors of chemical industry, machine-building, and food industry. This 
finding points to significant room for further liberalizing tariff unification. 
Good news for the consequences of this potential unification is that citizen welfare is 
ranked higher in government preference schedule than lobbying resources. This means that 
lobbying activities are not likely to dominate tariff policy. One can thus recommend liberalizing 
tariff unification as a promising strategy to follow during the adjustment period after the WTO 
accession. 
The principal question remains about the final destination of additional budget revenues 
made available by tariff reform. If they are used to produce valuable public goods, high weight 
placed by the government on budget revenues will be consistent with further raising citizen 
welfare. Otherwise, unproductive use of budget resources can make their increase less desirable. 
The most appropriate solution of this problem is to target expected revenue gains at the stage of 
planning tariff reform by stipulating particular budget lines whose financing will be raised with 
money made available by reform. In the real world, however, the practice of earmarking 
  22. 
revenues does not induce optimism, as it turns out much more a matter of promises than of actual 
policy. The second best option is thus to reduce burden of other distortive taxes by the sum of 
additional tariff revenues. This will reduce distortions generated by both trade and internal taxes, 
while keeping budget revenues constant, thus preventing additional distortive spending. 
 
 
4. LITERATURE 
Afontsev S. Endogenous Tariff Protection and the Level of Trade Distortions in Russia // Economics 
Education and Research Consortium, Working Paper Series, no.01/07E, 2002. 
Afontsev S. Political Economy of Tariff Protection in Russia. An Empirical Study // Economics 
Education and Research Consortium, Working Paper Series, no.99/16. Moscow, 2000. 
Andreoni J., Erard B. and Feinstein J. Tax Compliance // Journal of Economic Literature, June 1998, 
v.36, no.2, p.818-860. 
Corbo V. Trade Reform and Uniform Import Tariffs: The Chilean Experience // American Economic 
Review, May 1997, v.87, no.2, p.73–77. 
Edwards S. and Lederman D. The Political Economy of Unilateral Trade Liberalization: The Case of 
Chile // NBER Working Paper 6510, April 1998. 
External Sector of the Russian Economy: Contemporary Situation and Perspectives. Moscow, 2000, no.2 
(in Russian). 
Felli L. and Merlo A. Endogenous Lobbying // CEPR Discussion Paper no.3174, January 2002. 
Fishman R. and Wei Sh.-J. Tax Rates and Tax Evasion: Evidence from ‘Missing Imports’ in China // 
NBER Working Paper 8551, October 2001. 
Gawande K. and Bandyopadhyay U. Is Protection for Sale? Evidence on the Grossman–Helpman Theory 
of Endogenous Protection // The Review of Economics and Statistics, February 2000, v.82, no.1, 
p.139–152. 
Goldberg P. K. and Maggi G. Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation // American Economic 
Review, 1999, v.89, no.5, p.1135–1155. 
Grossman G.M. and Helpman E. Protection for Sale // American Economic Review, September 1994, 
v.84, no.4, p.833–850. 
Magee S. P., Brock W.A. and Young L. Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Protection Theory. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. 
Maggi G. and Rodriguez-Clare A. Import Penetration and the Politics of Trade Protection // Journal of 
International Economics, 2000, v.51, p.287–304. 
Mayda A.M. and Rodrik D. Why Are Some People (and Countries) More Protectionist than Others // 
CEPR Discussion Paper no.2960, September 2001. 
Mitra D. Endogenous Lobby Formation and Endogenous Protection: A Long-Run Model of Trade Policy 
Determination // American Economic Review, December 1999, v.89, no.5, p.1116–1134. 
Olson M. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1965. 
Pecorino P. Is There a Free-Rider Problem in Lobbying? Endogenous Tariffs, Trigger Strategies, and the 
Number of Firms // American Economic Review, June 1998, v.88, no.3, p.652–660. 
Senhadji A.S. Time Series Estimation of Structural Import Demand Equations: A Cross-Country Analysis 
// IMF Staff Papers, June 1998, v.45, no.2, p.236–268. 
Shiels C.R, Stern R.M. and Deadorff A.V. Estimates of the Elaslicities of Substitution between Imports 
and Home Goods for the United States // Weltwitschaftliches Archiv, 1986, Bd.122, H.3, S.497–
519. 
  23. 
Rodrik D. Political Economy of Trade Policy. In: G.Grossman and K.Rogoff (eds.). Handbook of 
International Economics. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1995, v.3, p.1457–1494. 
Tarr D. Arguments For and Against Uniform Tariffs. In: B.M.Hoekman, A.Mattoo, and 
P.English (eds.). Development, Trade, and the WTO: A Handbook. Washington, DC: The 
World Bank, 2002, p.526–534. 
Trefler D. The Case of the Missing Trade and Other Mysteries // American Economic Review, 
December 1995, v.85, no.5, p.1029–1046. 
  24. 
Appendix 1. Threshold Hypotheses for Identifying Organized Industries 
Figure A1 presents ranking of the first 100 industries in our database by the number of 
firms N. We assume that industries with N below certain level are organized, while others are 
not. We used three such levels. The first and the second ones precede large increases in the 
number of firms at N=70 (47 ‘organized’ industries) and N=129 (61 industries). The third one 
corresponds to the ‘turning point’ at the diagram, after which the number of firms starts to rise 
sharply (N=164; 72 ‘organized’ industries). 
 
Figure А1. Ranking of the First 100 Industries of the Database by Number of Firms 
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Appendix 2. Calculating the Import Misclassification Variable 
To calculate our measure of import misclassification µ, we need information on both 
observed and actual import volumes. The most obvious way to get actual import volumes (as 
they are unavailable from statistics) is to instrument the inverse import penetration variable zi ≡ 
Xi/Mi in 1999 with a standard set of variables used in trade structure analysis (see, e.g., Goldberg 
and Maggi, 1999). Using log(zi) as a dependent variable, we obtained the following best-fit 
specification of the inverse import penetration model (Table A1). 
 
Table A1. Model for Inverse Import Penetration (linear regression with robust standard errors) 
Variable Description Coefficient and  
t-statistics 
Labor intensity Share of wages in P&SC 0.023 
1.422 
Capital intensity Share of amortization payments in P&SC -0.056 
-1.089 
Fuel consumption Share of fuels in P&SC  0.016 
0.930 
Energy consumption Share of energy in P&SC -0.047 
-3.199*** 
Consumption of mineral 
resources 
Payments for mineral resources as a share of P&SC 0.089 
2.140** 
Land intensity Payments for land re-cultivation as a share of P&SC -0.595 
-0.760 
Lumber consumption Payments for lumber as a share of P&SC 0.495 
4.318*** 
Water consumption Payments for water as a share of P&SC 0.220 
1.458 
Scale of production (log) Average output per enterprise, $ th (log) 0.570 
4.791*** 
Y-intercept  -1.144 
-2.569** 
R2  0.320 
F-statistics  10.09*** 
P&SC – production & selling costs. 
*** – 1 per cent confidence level. 
 
Fitted values from the estimated model (converted from logs) were taken as 
approximations of the actual inverse import penetration Zi ≡ Xi/Mi. Then µ was calculated using 
the simple formula 
 
µ = 
i
im
M  
= 
i
i
z
Z  – 1. 
 
